M. S. v. Marple Newtown School District by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-22-2015 
M. S. v. Marple Newtown School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"M. S. v. Marple Newtown School District" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1322. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1322 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-1277 
________________ 
 
M.S., Minor Child through next best friend Marialisa Shihadeh; MARIALISA 
SHIHADEH; RAYMOND SHIHADEH, 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MARPLE NEWTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT; MARPLE NEWTOWN SCHOOL 
DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-05857) 
District Judge:  Honorable Luis Felipe Restrepo 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 5, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 22, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellants challenge the District Court’s dismissal of their claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
According to the Complaint in this action, minor child M.S.’s sister was sexually 
assaulted by B.C., a boy from M.S.’s high school.  Over the course of three years, and 
despite repeated requests to the contrary, the high school placed M.S. in classes with B.C. 
and his brother J.C., both of whom subjected M.S. to verbal and psychological 
harassment.  While in high school, M.S. was diagnosed with anxiety disorder and post-
traumatic stress syndrome.  The school nonetheless refused to assign M.S. and her 
harassers to different classrooms, and M.S. eventually transferred to homebound 
instruction to avoid contact with the brothers. 
M.S. and her family (Appellants here) brought claims against the school district 
and its board (collectively, the “School District”) under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“ADA”).  Appellants alleged that the School District failed to 
accommodate M.S.’s disabilities and retaliated against her family for asserting their 
Section 504 and ADA rights.  The District Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to exhaust their 
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administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-1482 (“IDEA”).1 
II. 
Congress enacted the IDEA to ensure that children with disabilities get access to a 
free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).2  The IDEA permits parents who believe 
their child is being denied a FAPE to file a complaint and obtain a hearing with respect to 
“any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the[ir] 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child . . . .”3  After 
completing—i.e., exhausting—this administrative hearing process, an aggrieved party 
may seek judicial review in federal court.4  A plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies under the IDEA deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.5   
Section 1415(l) of the IDEA requires plaintiffs to exhaust IDEA’s administrative 
process not only in actions brought directly under the statute, but also “in non-IDEA 
actions where the plaintiff seeks relief that can be obtained under the IDEA.”6  This 
provision “‘bars plaintiffs from circumventing the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement by 
taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and repackaging them as claims 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 530 (3d Cir. 2012).   
2 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).   
3 Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). 
4 Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).   
5 Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014).   
6 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).    
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under some other statute—e.g., section 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the 
ADA.’”7  A non-IDEA claim is subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement if it 
“relates[s] to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”8   
III. 
The Complaint asserts two claims under Section 504 and the ADA: (1) an 
accommodation claim based on the School District’s failure to separate M.S. from her 
harassers, and (2) a retaliation claim based on the School District’s response to 
complaints from M.S.’s mother.  Appellants concede that they did not pursue 
administrative remedies under the IDEA prior to bringing suit, and the Complaint does 
not plead exhaustion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).  What the Complaint does establish, 
however, is that Appellants’ claims could have been remedied through the IDEA 
administrative process because they relate to the “educational placement” of M.S. or to 
“the provision of a free appropriate public education” to M.S.   
Appellants’ first claim is that the School District failed to accommodate M.S.’s 
disabilities and denied her the benefits of the school’s educational programs by refusing 
to place M.S. and her antagonists in separate classrooms.9  This claim intrinsically 
                                              
7 Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 272 (quoting Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 
272, 281 (3d Cir. 1996)).   
8 Id. at 274 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)). 
9 See Compl. ¶ 45 (District “fail[ed] to accommodate M.S.’s disability by separating M.S. 
from J.C. and B.C.”); id. ¶ 46 (District “interfered with, discriminated against, or denied 
M.S.’s participation in or receipt of benefits, services, or opportunities in the school’s 
programs” by “failing to separate M.S. from B.C. and J.C.”).   
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concerns M.S.’s “educational placement.”  The complained-of conduct is the School 
District’s physical placement of M.S. in particular school classrooms; the remedy, by 
Appellants’ own admission, would have been for the School District to place M.S. in 
different classrooms.  Appellants’ accommodation claim therefore “relates to” the 
“educational placement of the child” under Section 1415 of the IDEA, and could have 
been remedied through the IDEA administrative process.10  Likewise, the allegations that 
the School District “excluded” M.S. from participating in the school’s education program 
or denied her the benefits and opportunities of the program all relate to the School 
District’s provision of an “appropriate public education” to M.S. under Section 1415 and 
could have been raised during the IDEA administrative process.  Accordingly, the School 
District Court properly dismissed Appellants’ accommodation claim. 
Appellants’ retaliation claim is likewise barred.  In Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media 
Sch. Dist., we held that “retaliation claims related to the enforcement of rights under the 
IDEA must be exhausted before a court may assert subject matter jurisdiction.”11  The 
Complaint alleges that M.S.’s mother “stridently campaigned to convince the district to 
separate M.S. from J.C. and B.C.”—that is, advocated for changes in M.S.’s “educational 
placement” and for improvements in the school’s provision of a “free appropriate public 
                                              
10 See Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 865 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“educational placement” under Section 1415 encompasses physical setting in which 
student receives education); D.M. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 801 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 
2015) (term “educational placement” is read expansively to encompass situations which, 
if altered, would likely “affect in some significant way the child’s learning experience” 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
11 759 F.3d at 275.   
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education.”12  The School District allegedly retaliated by disciplining M.S. at school, 
circulating an investigation report with private details about M.S. and her sister, and 
refusing to separate M.S. from J.C.  Because there is a “logical path to be drawn” from 
Appellants’ claims of retaliation to the School District’s failure to provide, and M.S.’s 
mother’s efforts to obtain, a satisfactory “educational placement” and “free appropriate 
public education” for M.S., the retaliation claims required exhaustion.13   
Appellants offer several arguments against dismissal, none convincing.  First, they 
urge us to overrule or in some way amend the holding in Batchelor.  But a panel of this 
Court may not overrule another panel’s decision.14  Second, Appellants rely on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), to argue that 
Batchelor should not be “retroactively” applied to this case on equitable grounds.  
Chevron Oil has been overruled, and the modern retroactivity rule is that a newly-
announced federal rule applies to all open, non-final cases pending in the district courts 
or on appeal.15   
Appellants also argue that this case is distinguishable from Batchelor because the 
child in that case had an Individualized Education Plan pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) 
that dictated the terms of his FAPE, while M.S. did not.  Appellants do not explain why 
this distinction should matter, and nothing in Batchelor suggests that the exhaustion 
                                              
12 Compl. ¶¶ 22, 55.   
13 See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 274. 
14 Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 2002).   
15 See Atl. Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d 652, 
672 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995)). 
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requirement extends only to claimants who have already availed themselves of IDEA 
safeguards.  Rather, Batchelor makes clear that any plaintiff raising claims that could be 
remedied through the IDEA’s administrative process must exhaust them before filing 
suit.16  Appellants next argue that Batchelor applies only to retaliation claims and not 
direct accommodation claims.  This reads Batchelor too narrowly: the general rule 
announced in Batchelor is that any non-IDEA claim is subject to the exhaustion 
requirement if it “relates to” the “identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”17 
Finally, Appellants argue that their accommodation claim could not have been 
redressed through the IDEA administrative process because it targets the school’s failure 
to prevent peer-to-peer bullying, rather than any particular shortfalls in M.S.’s education.  
This assertion is belied by the specific allegations in the Complaint.  Appellants do not 
claim that the School District failed to discipline the harassers or intercede in the 
harassment as it was happening.  Rather, as noted above, Appellants’ specific complaint 
is that the school failed to place M.S. in particular classroom settings, thereby 
exacerbating her post-traumatic stress syndrome and anxiety disorder.  Such a claim 
“relates to” the “educational placement” of a disabled, IDEA-eligible child, and could 
                                              
16 759 F.3d at 273-74.   
17 Id. at 274. 
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have been remedied through an IDEA hearing.18  It therefore required exhaustion under 
Batchelor. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court properly determined that the 
Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  But it was 
incorrect for the District Court to dismiss the case with prejudice.  Since the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction over the action, it had no power to render a judgment on the 
merits.19  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s January 5, 2015 order to the 
limited extent that it dismissed Appellants’ claims with prejudice, and remand for the 
District Court to enter an appropriate order. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
18 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (formulation of individualized education 
program for disabled student must identify the specific locations at which the child is to 
receive special education).   
19 See Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Dismissal with 
prejudice constitutes an adjudication of the merits as fully and completely as if the order 
had been entered after trial.”); Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.3d 95, 100 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (“When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
a case, it is precluded from rendering any judgments on the merits of the case.”).  For the 
same reason, the District Court’s alternative conclusion that the School District was 
entitled to summary judgment on Appellants’ Section 504 and ADA claims was not a 
valid ground for entering judgment in the School District’s favor. 
